... representational constancyMerzenich and deCarms 1996,66. Extending this idea Vacariu et al considered that at the conceptual level e can speak of a representational constancy even if the ensemble of neurons that corespond to it are in continuous changing. Representations of conceptual level approximates the processes from the neural level the stability from conceptual level is the result of this approximation. But I think that this stability about ich discuss Vacariu et al is a relative one it is rather a question of speed of motion, at least at the level of the flux of thoughts even at level of contents of single concepts there are sometimes historical changes. Hoever, Vacariu et al stability is relative to some loer faster changes. The rate of changes of those to flux of changes is different. The changes at neural level are continuos, but there is a threshold of changing hen this threshold is exceeded some modifications of representations from the conceptual level appear. For exemple, in connectionism, excitation or inhibition of a knot depend on the signals ich are recepted from other knots and, there is a threshold of the activation function. If the value of a recepted signal is biger than the value of threshlod function than the knot is activated, if no it is inhibated. The activation state of a unity is determined by the total input of this unity, relation beteen knots being more important than unities taken separately. Vacariu et al consider that our cognitive sistem and even our senses are determined by the our ecological recess. For exemple, our body have the ability to feel a certain scale of frequences hen it is subjected to some repeted touch on a hand. Under a threshold, touch seem to be discrete. Over this threshold, they appear continuos. Relative to our cognitive sistem, crossing from one level of distinctionscontinuity-discontinuity, static-in motion, stability-variability to other one is duet by exceeding a threshold determinated by our ecological recess. Hoever, at the conceptual level e can speak about a similarity interval in ich structures, states, processes inteligible as approximations of structures, states and processes from the neural level appear as identical, even if their neural activation patterns are different. Speaking about this interval of similarity, also, e should to take in consideration to type of changes one at the neural level, and other from environment hen the changes of activation paterns exceed a certain threshold, some change appear at the conceptual level, and hen the environmental changes attain a certain threshold, e can distinguish them sensorialy. Human beings, as cognitive sistems, are open complex sistems, organized in many levels. In acord ith many authors, consider Vacariu et al, behaviour is a self-organizing macroscopic structure ich appear as a result of interactions beteen micro and macro scales of organization. Or as it is put by Keijer, behaviour is a multiple-scalar phenomenon, involving the patterns of a variety of scales of organization, is the result of interaction beteen pre-existing orders from this sistems and consist in reciprocal modulation of neural, bodily and environmental dinamicsKeijer 1997, 204. Or more simply, behaviour is the result of dinamical interaction beteen body, brain and environment. Vacariu et al consider that cognition ...is the result of multiple interactions beteen the levels of organism, and beteen every level and environment. No, e should to question us if this explanations are complet or sufficient. If this explanations explain also human aging or digestion hat are the sense of those interactions hat are their function hat are their utility hat are the contents of those intercations hat are epistemological and gnoseological value These explanations are only mechanical. I consider that, this explanations are hy-explanations, because they use the phrase r ... Download